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If there was malicious code in a legitimate project hosted on , would we remove access to it, including for security researchers?

Short: No!

We are considering how to prevent fetching malicious code by accident, though.

In any case, we are open to collaborating with security researchers. Interested? Help us build a malware hunting team: codeberg.org/Codeberg/Contribu

Background: locked access to source code of xz, which was background of active investigation from the community.

Codeberg.org[Team] Malware hunting### About the team This is an idea in case someone is interested to get involved with this topic. Codeberg is abused for spreading malware, like many other places. It is certainly interesting, because a lot of malware we see is either new. We're somewhat close to the source. We have some s...
Codeberg.org

To people looking for an archive of the XZ code, you might want to check out tukaani.org/xz-backdoor/ which links to git.tukaani.org/. GitHub is not the only source of truth, although meta information about the Pull Requests is locked in to this silo.

tukaani.orgXZ Utils backdoor

@Codeberg Many thanks for your work on openess. It's another proof that git history is not sufficient and we cannot tolerate a locked silo like Github. PR, issues, comments and everything else are an essential part of the repository, the code is not enough.

@Codeberg One idea I have for preventing accidental fetches of malicious code would be to prevent access through the primary domain, and require the use of a seperate (sub)domain such as [caution.codeberg.org](caution.codeberg.org), or [codeberg-caution.org](codeberg-caution.org). Weither this is done throgh a seperate instance it is cloned to, or via special handeling in the forejo would be up to debate.