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Anoxinon e.V. 
Drop what you're doing and read this incredible story, which recounts how a reporter for The Atlantic was inadvertently included in a private Signal discussion group that appears to have included Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Sec. of State Marco Rubio and other administration officials discussing plans for an upcoming U.S. military assault on Yemen.
The reporter, Jeff Goldberg, said he was convinced it was all an elaborate hoax as they laid out the pros and cons of specific attack options, and discussed targets over the course of a week. That is, until they shared on the Signal chat exactly where and when the targets in Yemen would be hit, and then those targets got hit exactly when they'd said.
"The world found out shortly before 2 p.m. eastern time on March 15 that the United States was bombing Houthi targets across Yemen."
"I, however, knew two hours before the first bombs exploded that the attack might be coming. The reason I knew this is that Pete Hegseth, the secretary of defense, had texted me the war plan at 11:44 a.m. The plan included precise information about weapons packages, targets, and timing.
"According to the lengthy Hegseth text, the first detonations in Yemen would be felt two hours hence, at 1:45 p.m. eastern time. So I waited in my car in a supermarket parking lot. If this Signal chat was real, I reasoned, Houthi targets would soon be bombed. At about 1:55, I checked X and searched Yemen. Explosions were then being heard across Sanaa, the capital city."
"I went back to the Signal channel. At 1:48, “Michael Waltz” had provided the group an update. Again, I won’t quote from this text, except to note that he described the operation as an “amazing job.” A few minutes later, “John Ratcliffe” wrote, “A good start.” Not long after, Waltz responded with three emoji: a fist, an American flag, and fire. Others soon joined in, including “MAR,” who wrote, “Good Job Pete and your team!!,” and “Susie Wiles,” who texted, “Kudos to all – most particularly those in theater and CENTCOM! Really great. God bless.” “Steve Witkoff” responded with five emoji: two hands-praying, a flexed bicep, and two American flags."
"I have never seen a breach quite like this. It is not uncommon for national-security officials to communicate on Signal. But the app is used primarily for meeting planning and other logistical matters—not for detailed and highly confidential discussions of a pending military action. And, of course, I’ve never heard of an instance in which a journalist has been invited to such a discussion."
Let’s remember WHY they were using signal — they were doing it because signal deletes messages after a pre-set time. They were doing this using a non-official channel — in violation of lots of law — in order to keep their discussions secret and away from Congress, judges and the law.
@Dhmspector That thought had definitely occurred to me. I'd not been aware of and/or forgotten that Signal auto-deletes content, in violation of US gov't data retention laws.
Thanks.
@dredmorbius @Dhmspector @briankrebs the auto delete is an optional setting in signal. But signal is one of the more secure messengers available, end to end encrypted and without a possibility of a backdoor. I see why they'd use that.
@Wolfi As I've seen discussed elsewhere, there are other problems presented:
Smartphones themselves are conspicuously insecure, and even the use of secure protocols and apps leaves other avenues of attack on the device open.
Signal apparently has provisions for sharing or forwarding conversations, and at least one of the discussion participants was in Russia at the time of the discussion, which ... raises further concerns.
Features which would be desirable for secure comms (e.g., ACLs, or ensuring that all members of a given discussion have specific security clearances) are missing from the app. If one could, say, issue invites to a group of people and only permit those with specific certifications / security clearances from participating, joining, or even being notified of the discussion the picture would be improved, though other issues (mentioned above or otherwise) could still present themselves.
Casual observations from public use / use outside SCIF could present information leaks.
OpSec is exceedingly poor here.